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CATHERINE JEAN ARCHIBALD'
Forbidden by the WTO?
Discrimination Against a Product
When Its Creation Causes Harm to the
Environment or Animal Welfare
ABSTRACT
Sometimes countries make distinctions between seemingly identical
products because of the different impact that each product's pro-
cessing method has on the environment and/or on animal welfare.
When used appropriately, these distinctions can be a powerful force
toward positive environmental change, sustainable development,
and increased animal welfare. This article shows how environmental
and animal welfare process and production (PPM) distinctions can
and should exist within the framework of the international trade
regime.
INTRODUCTION
The way that a product is made can impact the environment, or
animal welfare, or both. Different production processes often have different
levels of impact. Thus, in order to help the environment or animal welfare,
a country may decide to prohibit the importation of a product from one
producer or country, even while allowing the importation of a seemingly
identical product from a different producer or country. For example, a
country may decide to ban the import of shrimp that are caught using
methods that kill endangered sea turtles while allowing the import of
shrimp that are caught using methods that do not harm turtles.' When used
appropriately,2 these process and production method (PPM) distinctions
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1. See infra Part II-III.
2. See infra Part I.F (discussing inappropriate discrimination).
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have been and continue to be a powerful force toward positive environ-
mental change and increased animal welfare.3
The world trade regime was created in order to prevent govern-
ments from restraining trade.4 PPM distinctions should not be prohibited
by the World Trade Organization (WTO) regime, and, indeed, there are
several places within the regime where they fit-namely in the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Articles III.4, XI.2(b), XX(a), XX(b),
and XX(g).' This article will demonstrate how environmental and animal
welfare PPM distinctions can exist within the framework of the inter-
national trade regime.
The Tuna/Dolphin I dispute6 in 1991 involved a U.S. law that, in an
effort to protect dolphins, prohibited the import of tuna that was caught
using methods that killed dolphins. Mexico challenged the U.S. law as an
illegal trade embargo, and the dispute was brought before a GATT panel.
A GAT[ panel, which is now no longer used, was a panel of three or five
neutral trade experts who would decide whether a party was in violation
of its international trade treaty obligations under the GAT. 7 If the panel
found a violation, the Contracting Parties of the GATT could vote (consen-
sus was required) to adopt the panel report.8 Under this system, it was
relatively easy for a losing party to vote to block the adoption of the report
and thus avoid the legal obligation to follow the panel's direction. However,
if the report were adopted, the party found in violation of the treaty obliga-
tion was legally obligated to change its law to conform to the panel's
decision.9
3. See Steve Charnovitz, The Law of Environmental "PPMs" in the WVTO: Debunking the
Myth of Illegality, 27 YALE J. INT'L L. 59, 70 (2002) (giving examples of environmental PPMs
throughout history that have acted to help the environment); see also infra notes 100-103 and
accompanying text.
4. JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: CONSTITUTION AND JURISPRU-
DENCE 22-23 (1998).
5. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1944, Apr. 15,1994. Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, THE LEGAL TExTS: THE REsuLTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 17 (1999), 1867 U.T.S. 187,33 I.L.M.
1153(1994) [hereinafter GATT], availableathttp://www.wto.org/English/res-e/bookspe/
analytic-index__e/gattl994..01_e.htm#general (last visited Apr. 7, 2008). See General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947,61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
6. Report of the Panel, United States -Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS21/R, GAIT
BASICINSTRUMENTS &SELECrEDDOCUMENM39S/155 (Sept. 3,1991) [hereinafter Tuna/Dolphin
I], available at http://www.wto.org/gattdocs/English/SULPDF/91530924.pdf.
7. See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYsTEM 115 (2d ed. 2000) (1997)
(explaining the GATT dispute resolution processes).
8. Id. at 117.
9. See id. at 117,126.
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The Shrimp/Furtle I dispute'0 in 1998 involved a different but similar
U.S. law that prohibited the import of shrimp caught in a manner that killed
sea turtles. Four Asian countries challenged the U.S. law, and the dispute
was brought in front of first a WTO panel, and then the WTO Appellate
Body.
In 1995, the WTO was formed as an evolution of the GATT system,
and the dispute resolution system was strengthened." The GATT
Agreement became part of the WTO Agreement. A WTO panel, like the
GATT panels before it, is a panel of three neutral trade experts who decide
whether a party is in violation of its international trade treaty obligations.
Unlike a GATT panel report, once a WTO panel report is issued, it is
automatically adopted unless there is consensus among the WTO member
countries to block adoption. Thus, it is much harder for a country to block
a decision that it does not like under the WTO than under the former GATT
system. A losing party may appeal to the WTO Appellate Body, a panel
made up of three neutral trade experts. Once the Appellate Body issues its
report, it also is automatically adopted unless there is consensus among
WTO members to block the adoption. Once a panel report or an Appellate
Body report is adopted, a losing party to a dispute is legally obligated to
change its law to conform to the report's decision. 2 A decision of the panel
or of the Appellate Body is not binding on future decisions, although it may
be persuasive.
While the Tuna/Dolphin I dispute panel held that an environ-
mentally and animal-welfare motivated PPM distinction was forbidden by
the world trading regime, the final outcome of the more recent Shrimp/Furtle
dispute upheld such a PPM distinction. 3 This more recent case means that
environmental and animal welfare goals need not be thwarted by the
WTO/GATT trade regime. The Shrimp/Turtle II interpretation allows the
regime to strike an appropriate balance between trade and the environment,
and trade and animal welfare. Part I of this article will examine in detail the
Tuna/Dolphin dispute and show why the reasoning of the panel was faulty
10. Appellate Body Report, United States - Import Prohibition of Shrimp and Certain Shrimp
Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12,1998) [hereinafter Shrimp/Turtle f], http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop-e/dispu-e/cases-e/ds58_e.htm (follow "Appellate Body Report" hyperlink;
then follow "preview (HTML)" hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 7, 2008).
11. See JACKSON, supra note 7, at 124-27 (explaining the WTO dispute resolution process).
12. Id. at 126 (noting that although the WTO Agreement does not make this obligation
explicit, it is implied through a combination of clauses read together).
13. Appellate Body Report, United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, Recourse to Art. 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001)
[hereinafter Shrimp/Turtle If], http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-.e/dispue/cases-e/
ds58_e.htm (follow "Article 21.5 Appellate Body Report" hyperlink; then follow "preview
(HTML)" hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 7, 2008); see also infra Part Ill.
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when it interpreted the GATT provisions. Parts 11 and III will examine the
Shrimp/Turtle dispute and explain how the outcome of this dispute paints
a hopeful picture for countries that wish to adopt trade measures to protect
the environment and/or animal welfare.
Future disputes brought before the WTO should continue the trend
initiated by the Shrimp/Turtle decisions and interpret any ambiguities in the
regime in a way that is favorable to protecting the environment and/or
animal welfare. There are two reasons for this. First, the WTO preamble
itself, in tune with contemporary understandings of the dire straits that the
environment of the planet is in, 4 specifically states that the WTO
Agreement should allow for "the optimal use of the world's resources in
accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to
protect and preserve the environment."5 This purpose can be contrasted with
the GATT Agreement that had as its object "the full use of the world's
resources." 6 Thus, perhaps the Tuna/Dolphin panel can be excused for its
animal welfare and environmentally unfriendly decision because it was
interpreting the GATT provisions in the context of a treaty whose object was
simply the full use of resources. However, there can be no such excuse for
future disputes interpreted under the WTO Agreement, a treaty whose
object recognizes the need to balance trade with other important considera-
tions. The Appellate Body has recognized that any ambiguities in the WTO
Agreement should be interpreted in such a manner as to fulfill the objective
and purpose of the WTO Agreement, which includes the purposes of
fostering sustainable development and a healthy environment. 7 Further,
the Appellate Body has noticed that trade restrictions are the "heaviest
weapon" a country has to prevent a harmful process." Since trade
restrictions can help solve environmental and animal welfare problems,
they should not be banned if used appropriately. 9
14. See generally DAVIDHUNTERETAL.,INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY
(3d ed. 2007) (describing numerous serious international environmental problems such as
global warming, hazardous wastes, and endangered species).
15. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Preamble, Apr. 15, 1994,33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) (emphasis added) [hereinafter
WTO Agreement].
16. See GATT Agreement 1947, supra note 5; Shrimp/Turtle 1, supra note 10, 152.
17. Appellate Body Report, Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, 39, WT/DS8/AB/R
(Oct. 4,1996) [hereinafter Japan - Taxes on Alcohol], http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/
dispue/cases.e/ds8_e.htm (follow "Appellate Body Report" hyperlink; then follow
"preview (HTML)" hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 7, 2008).
18. See Shrimp/Turtle I, supra note 10, 171; see also Virginia Dailey, Sustainable
Development: Reevaluating the Trade vs. Turtles Conflict at the WTO, 9 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & PoL'Y
331, 377 (2000) (stating that "trade sanctions are the best arrow in the environmentalists'
quiver").
19. For examples of inappropriate use, see infra Part II.B.
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There is no doubt that in order to fix the world's numerous
environmental problems and animal welfare atrocities, attention must be
paid to the way that products are made. Few things are made with the
desire to harm the environment or animals. Rather, such harm is caused
incidentally in the process of working toward other goals. Thus, it is vital
that governments intervene to provide incentives for producers to change
harmful processes. Sometimes the best way a government can do this is by
forbidding trade in products made with animal-unfriendly or environ-
mentally harmful processes.2'
I. TUNA/DOLPHIN 1 (1991)
The Tuna/Dolphin I dispute between Mexico and the United States
arose in 1990 when the United States banned the importation of yellowfin
tuna and yellowfin tuna products from Mexico.21 Historically, in order to
catch tuna, fishers would specifically set their nets over areas where
dolphins swam. This was because dolphins swim near schools of tuna.
However, because dolphins are mammals and need to come up periodically
for air, they would drown when caught in the nets. In 1986, over 130,000
dolphins died in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean as a result of such
fishing methods.2 By 1991, due to changes in fishing law and methods, this
number was down to below 30,000.23
The U.S. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 (MMPA) set
dolphin protection standards for both domestic and foreign fishing boats to
ensure the protection of dolphins.24 The MMPA was passed because of the
close connection between fishing for tuna and harming dolphins, at least in
the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean. 2 The MMPA provided for an
importation ban on yellowfin tuna from any country that could not
demonstrate that its standards for protecting dolphins were comparable to
U.S. standards.26 In 1990, the United States banned the importation of
yellowfin tuna products from Mexico under this law.27
20. See supra notes 3, 18 and accompanying text; see also Report of the Panel, United
States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 5.1, DS29/R (June 16,1994) [hereinafter Tuna/Dolphin
I!],http://www.wto.org/gatt-docs/English/SULPDF/91790155.pdf(describinghowforced
changes in production processes resulted in a dolphin death rate that was one fifth of what
it had been before the changes).
21. Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 6, 2.7.
22. Tuna/Dolphin II, supra note 20, 5.1.
23. Id.
24. Id. 2.5-2.8.
25. Id. 72.2.
26. Id. 72.9.
27. Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 6, 2.7.
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United States law required that the average dolphin death rate for
Mexico's tuna fleet not exceed 1.25 times the average annual dolphin death
rate of U.S. vessels. 8 United States law also required that the share of
Eastern spinner dolphin and coastal spotted dolphin relative to total killings
of dolphin by Mexico's fleet during each one-year fishing season must not
exceed 15 percent and two percent respectively. Meanwhile, the U.S. fleet
had absolute numbers of Eastern spinner dolphin and coastal spotted
dolphin above which it could not kill. 9
Mexico argued that the embargo was a quantitative restriction, in
violation of GATT Article XI. The United States argued that its measure
was not a quantitative restriction, but rather an internal regulation affecting
the sale or distribution of a product, consistent with GATT Article III.4.3' In
the alternative, the United States argued that its measures were consistent
with GATT because they were covered by the animal welfare and
environmental exceptions found in GATr Articles XX(b) 32 and XX(g).' The
28. Id. 2.6.
29. Id. 72.4, 2.6.
30. Id. 3.1. GATr Article. XI.1 provides that
[n]o prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges,
whether made effective through quotas, import or export licences or other
measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the
importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting party or
on the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the territory
of any other contracting party.
GATT, supra note 5, art. XI.1.
31. Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 6, 1 3.6. GATT Article III.4 provides in part,
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less
favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect
of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale,
offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use.
GATr, supra note 5, art. III.4.
32. Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 6, 3.6(b). GATT Article XX(b) provides,
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised
restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be
construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party
of measures: ... (b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health.
GATT, supra note 5, art. XX(b).
33. Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 6, 3.6(b). GATT Article XX(g) provides,
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised
restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be
construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party
of measures:.. .(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural
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panel found that the import restriction violated GATT Article III and Article
XI.1 and was not justified by either GATT Article XX(b) or Article XX(g). 4
The GAIT panel was correct in deciding that the U.S. measures
were inconsistent with the GATT, but its reasoning was flawed, as will be
shown below.
A. GATT Article III: National Treatment Is Required, but "Likeness"
Should Be Interpreted to Allow PPM Distinctions
GATT Article III lays out a "national treatment" obligation re-
quiring each contracting country to treat foreign products no less favorably
than it treats "like" domestic products.35 Article III aims to ensure equality
of treatment between imported and domestic products so that a country
cannot unfairly protect and favor its domestic products over products from
another country.' Article 111.4 requires that "[t]he products of the territory
of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting
party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to
like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and require-
ments affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transporta-
tion, distribution or use."37
One author asserts that Article III does not "allow for differential
treatment based on characteristics of the production process rather than the
product itself."3 However, this assertion is based on an old GATT case,
Belgian Family Allowances, which prohibited differential treatment of
products based on whether the other country followed a particular social
policy of giving monetary breaks to families.39 As will be shown below,
Article III should allow for differential treatment based on production
process differences in certain circumstances, particularly when the
differences in production processes cause different environmental or animal
welfare impacts.
resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restric-
tions on domestic production or consumption.
GATT, supra note 5, art. XX(g).
34. Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 6, paras 5.15, 7.1.
35. See Kevin C. Kennedy, The GAiT-WTO System at Fifty, 16 WIS. INVIL L.J. 421,425
(1998) (explaining the GATT/WTO system).
36. WTO APPELLATE BODY REPERTORY OF REPORTS AND AWARDS 1995-2005, at 324
(compiled by the Appellate Body Secretariat, 2006).
37. GATr, supra note 5, art. I1.4 (emphasis added).
38. JACKSON, supra note 7, at 218.
39. Id. at 218 n.19; Report of the Panel, Belgian Family Allowances, G/32 (Nov. 6,1952),
GATT BAsIc INSTRUMENTS & SELECTED Docs. 59 (1st Supp. 1953), available at
http://www.wto.org/gatt-docs/English/SULPDF/90670110.pdf.
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
The Tuna/Dolphin I panel decided that U.S. and Mexican tuna were
like products because the products were indistinguishable.' The panel
reasoned that the way the products were produced did not affect their
quality as products; therefore, the United States must treat both types of
tuna equally.4' This became known as the notorious process versus product
distinction.' Thus, the panel found that two products are "like" no matter
how each is made. The panel should have found that the U.S. measures
violated Article III, not because dolphin-safe tuna is a "like product" to
dolphin-unsafe tuna, but rather because the measures unfairly afforded
protection to domestic production.
1. The Text of Article III Shows PPM Distinctions Should Be Allowed
The panel decision is flawed because Article III is mainly concerned
with measures taken by countries that have as their aim the protection of
domestic industry. Indeed, Article Ill explicitly contemplates countries
making distinctions between products based on processing. 3 Article 111.1
states that "[tihe contracting parties recognize that.. .internal quantitative
regulations requiring the mixture, processing or use of products in specified
amounts or proportions, should not be applied to imported or domestic
products so as to afford protection to domestic production."44 Article 111.5 states
that "[n]o contracting party shall establish or maintain any internal quanti-
tative regulation relating to the mixture, processing or use of products in
specified amounts or proportions which requires, directly or indirectly, that
any specified amount or proportion of any product which is the subject of
the regulation must be supplied from domestic sources."4' Article 111.7
provides that" [n]o internal quantitative regulation relating to the mixture,
processing or use of products in specified amounts or proportions shall be
applied in such a manner as to allocate any such amount or proportion
among external sources of supply."' By forbidding particular types of
processing regulations, Article III implies that if a processing regulation is
not applied in one of the forbidden ways (i.e., is not applied in order to
protect domestic production, does not require use of domestic resources,
and does not require the use of certain proportions of external supply), it
40. Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 6, 5.15.
41. Id.
42. See, e.g., Michael Gregory, Environment, Sustainable Development, Public Participation
and the NAFTA: A Retrospective, 7 J. ENVTL. L. & LrrlG. 99,136 (1992).
43. See Steve Charnovitz, Green Roots, Bad Pruning: GATT Rules and Their Application to
Environmental Trade Measures, 7 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 299, 320 (1994).
44. GATr, supra note 5, art. III.1 (emphasis added).
45. Id. art. M.5 (emphasis added).
46. Id. art. I.7 (emphasis added).
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should be valid."' The Tuna/Dolphin I panel found that the process used to
produce a product is irrelevant in determining whether two products are
"like products" under Article 111.4. Instead, the panel should have found
that the U.S. measures violated Article III, not because dolphin-safe tuna is
a "like product" to dolphin-unsafe tuna, but rather because the measures
unfairly afforded protection to domestic production, as will be explained
shortly.
Indeed, several GATT and WTO decisions since Tuna/Dolphin I
have affirmed the right of a country to make PPM distinctions for legitimate
policy purposes not related to protecting internal markets. A 1992 GATT
panel, examining U.S. alcohol import laws under prohibition, explained that
Article III is limited in purpose: "Article III is.. .not to prevent contracting
parties from using their fiscal and regulatory powers for purposes other
than to afford protection to domestic production." 48
Similarly, a 1994 GATT panel, United States - Taxes on Automobiles,
found that automobiles sold above and below $30,000 were not "like
products" to each other. The panel reasoned that the purpose of Article III
was set out in Article III.1 and that "Article III serves only to prohibit
regulatory distinctions between products applied so as to afford protection
to domestic production. Its purpose is not to prohibit fiscal and regulatory
distinctions applied so as to achieve other policy goals." 9 The panel also
noted that the practice of panels had been to analyze differences in
treatment under Article III using factors such as: product end-use,
consumer tastes and habits, and the nature and quality of the product.' The
panel noted that " [n]on-protectionist government policies might, however,
require regulatory distinctions that were not based on the product's end
use, its physical characteristics, or the other factors mentioned."5' The panel
noted that "a primary purpose of the General Agreement was to lower
barriers to trade between markets, and not to harmonize the regulatory
treatment of products within them"; therefore, the panel reasoned that
"Article III could not be interpreted as prohibiting government policy
options, based on products, that were not taken so as to afford protection
47. Charnovitz, supra note 3, at 86.
48. GATr, Report of the Panel on United States - Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt
Beverages, 16 March 1992, GATT Doc. DS23/R, § 5.25, GATT BAsIC INSTRUMENTS & SELECTED
DOCUMENTS 39S/206, available at http://www.wto.org/gatt-docs/English/SULPDF/
91610002.pdf.
49. Report of the Panel, United States-Taxes on Automobiles, § 5.7, GAT BAsIc
INSTRUMENTS & SELECTED DocumENS DS31/R (Oct. 11, 1994), available at http://www.wto.
org/gattdocs/English/SULPDF/91810174.pdf.
50. Id. § 5.8.
51. Id.
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to domestic production." 2 The panel then decided that the "aim and effect"
of the distinction should be analyzed in determining likeness to see if the
aim and effect was to protect domestic products unfairly.'
Under the reasoning of the panel in United States - Taxes on
Automobiles, both the purpose and the effect of a measure should be
analyzed to determine whether the measure violates Article III. If the
purpose of the measure is not domestic protectionism, but rather some
other legitimate regulatory goal such as environmental or animal welfare
protection, then the measure should not violate Article III, even if the
measure incidentally hurts international trade.
The 1996 WTO Appellate Body Decision in Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic
Beverages' disagreed with the "aim and effect" test, stating that it does not
matter what the intent of a country is in making a law; if its effect is to
protect domestic production, then it violates Article III.' 5 This disagreement
can be explained by the ambiguous language of Article 111.1 that reads,
"internal charges, and laws, regulations.. .should not be applied.. .so as to
afford protection to domestic production."' It is not clear whether "so as to
afford" means "intended to afford" or "in effect affording." However,
changes in regulations affecting trade can be expected to incidentally
impact the comparative advantage of one country over another.5 7 Further,
conditions may change such that a regulation that once helped the foreign
industry now helps the domestic industry. Therefore, the interpretation of
the 1994 GATT panel in Taxes on Automobiles finding that a measure will not
violate Article III unless both its aim and effect is protectionism, is
preferable and should be followed by future panels. This interpretation
allows governments to make appropriate policy regulations without being
constrained by how their decisions might incidentally affect international
comparative advantage. Additionally, this interpretation will reduce the
number of claims possible under Article III and will enable countries to take
regulatory action they deem appropriate. This is especially so considering
that some regulatory measures may be taken to protect the environment
and/or animal welfare, such as the ones at issue in the Tuna/Dolphin and
Shrimp/Furtle disputes. As the Appellate Body has emphasized, the words
in the WTO treaty should be given their ordinary meaning, read in light of
the objective and purpose of the treaty.s8 Here, since the ordinary meaning
52. Id.
53. Id. § 5.10.
54. Japan - Taxes on Alcohol, supra note 17.
55. Id. § 57.
56. GATT", supra note 5, art. 111.1 (emphasis added).
57. See generally Alan 0. Sykes, Comparative Advantage and the Normative Economics of
International Trade Policy, 1 J. INT'L ECON. L. 49 (1998).
58. Japan - Taxes on Alcohol, supra note 17, § 39.
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of the phrase "so as to afford protection" in Article I1.1 is not clear, any
future panel should look to the objective and purpose of the WTO treaty,
which includes the promotion of sustainable development and environ-
mental protection.5 9
Both the WTO Appellate Body in Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages
and the GATT panel in United States - Taxes on Automobiles agreed that the
term "like products" in Article III.2 should be construed narrowly.' The
Appellate Body said that whether products are "like" should be determined
on a case-by-case basis and should take into account "the product's end-
uses in a given market; consumers tastes and habits, which change from
country to country; the product's properties, nature and quality."6
Consumer-citizens often have tastes and desires that include protecting the
environment and/ or animal welfare. These preferences can be expressed by
legislation passed by their governments that includes measures such as
PPM trade distinctions.
2. Consumers Are Likely to Prefer Products Made by Less Harmful Methods
The Tuna/Dolphin I panel's reasoning that dolphin-unsafe tuna is a
"like product" to dolphin-safe tuna is faulty because it was internally
inconsistent with other parts of the panel's decision. In finding that the
United States may have standards regarding the labeling of tuna as
"dolphin-safe," the panel recognized that consumers may have a preference
for "dolphin-safe" tuna over "non-dolphin-safe" tuna.62 Australia, a third
party to the dispute, recognized that for the concerned consumer, tuna
labeled as "dolphin-safe" was not comparable to tuna not so labeled.'
59. The preamble to the WTO Agreement states that the trade regime should be carried
out so as to allow "the optimal use of the world's resources in accordance with the objective
of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment...." WTO
Agreement, supra note 15.
60. Japan - Taxes on Alcohol, supra note 17, § 43.
61. Id. § 44 (citations omitted); see also Appellate Body Report, Canada - Certain Measures
Concerning Periodicals, 36, WT/DS31/AB/R (June 30, 1997), http://www.wto.org/
english/tratope/dispue/cases e/ds3le.htm (follow "Appellate Body Report" hyperlink;
then follow "preview (HTML)" hyperlink) (recognizing three things to look at in determining
whether two products are "like products": (1) the product's end-uses in a given market; (2)
consumers' tastes and habits; and (3) the product's properties, nature, and quality). Later
decisions added a fourth criterion: the tariff classification of the product. See Appellate Body
Report, European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos,
§ 73, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12,2001) [hereinafter Measures AffectingAsbestos], http://www.
wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispue/casese/ds135_e.htm (follow "Appellate Body Report"
hyperlink; then follow "preview (HTML)" hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 7,2008).
62. Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 6, § 5.42.
63. Id. § 4.6 (argument of Australia).
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If consumers have an ethical preference for one over the other, then
surely the products are not "like products" to those consumers. Thus,
because the panel recognized that consumers were likely to have a
preference for dolphin-safe tuna, it should also have recognized that
dolphin-safe and dolphin-unsafe tuna should not be considered "like
products" under Article III. Indeed, as discussed, later dispute panels have
specifically recognized that consumer preference should impact whether
two products are considered "like products" under Article III.
64
3. All Other Relevant Factors Should Be Considered When Determining
"Likeness"
In the Asbestos dispute, the WTO Appellate Body found that even
though "health risk" was not an included factor in the traditional list
considered to determine whether products are "like products" under
Article 111.4, "health risk" was a relevant factor in deciding whether the two
products at issue were "like products."' "[I] n examining the 'likeness' of
products, panels must evaluate all of the relevant evidence."' Relevant to
"likeness," the Appellate Body noted that "asbestos fibres have been
recognized internationally as a known carcinogen.... "67 The Appellate Body
also noted that, although there was no evidence on the matter, "[w]e
consider it likely that the presence of a known carcinogen in one of the
products will have an influence on consumers' tastes and habits regarding
that product."' Similarly, when there are known differences in environ-
mental and animal welfare effects, this too should be considered likely to
have an impact on consumer tastes and habits.
The Asbestos Body recognized that, even though not traditionally
analyzed, "health risk" to humans was a relevant factor to consider in
deciding whether two products are "like products" in the particular case
before it. Similarly, even though not traditionally analyzed, "health risk" to
the environment or animal welfare should be considered a relevant factor
in cases where the production of two seemingly identical products results
in significant differences in environmental or animal health. Just as the
Appellate Body found that the knowledge of a known carcinogen in a
product would likely influence consumers' desire for the product, so too
would knowledge of a known negative animal welfare or environmental
impact probably influence consumers' desire for that product. This
reasoning is particularly strong for future disputes where environmental
64. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
65. Measures Affecting Asbestos, supra note 61, 113.
66. Id.
67. Id. 135.
68. Id. 145.
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health is implicated for at least three reasons. First, it is internationally
recognized that the environment is suffering from severe stress.6 9 Second
this severe stress has direct implications for human as well as animal
health.7' Third, the preamble to the WTO specifically recognizes the goals
of sustainable development and environmental protection, which should
influence the interpretation of the ambiguous term "like products."
4. However, the U.S. Measures Were Unfairly Discriminatory
The U.S. provisions at issue in Tuna/Dolphin I should have been
found to violate Article III, not because Mexican tuna was a "like product"
to U.S. tuna, but because under Article III.1, the U.S. provisions should have
been seen as "laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale
[and] offering for sale .... applied to imported or domestic products so as to
afford protection to domestic production." As the panel found, the U.S.
regulations did not treat domestic and foreign producers equally or fairly.
The domestic producers were told a maximum number of dolphins they
could kill, in advance of the fishing season. By contrast, the foreign
producers were given a number retroactively and only after the numbers
of dolphin deaths from U.S. ships had been counted.7' This made it harder
for the foreign producers to know in advance whether they were meeting
the U.S. requirements, a problem that the U.S. producers did not have. This
distinction, having no possible legitimate policy reason, should have been
judged a violation of Article 111.1 because it favored domestic production
over foreign production.
Arguably, the U.S. measures also violated Article III because they
did not give Mexican producers who used dolphin-safe methods an
opportunity to sell to consumers in the United States, unlike U.S. producers
who used dolphin-safe methods. Canada, a third party, made this argument
and said that the embargo was not an internal measure under Article III
because it forbade all imports of yellowfin tuna products from a specific
country.72 It could be argued that Mexican dolphin-safe tuna is a "like
product" to U.S. dolphin-safe tuna. Under this type of analysis, the United
States would be able to ban imports of dolphin-unsafe tuna, wherever it
came from, but should not ban all tuna from an individual country.
69. See generally HUNTER ET AL., supra note 14 (describing numerous serious international
environmental problems such as global warming, hazardous wastes, and endangered species).
70. See, e.g., IPCC, 2007, Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS,
ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY. CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE FOURTH
ASSESMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 12 (M.L. Parry
et al. eds., 2007), availableathttp://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg 2 -
spm.pdf (describing the negative health effect on humans caused by global warming).
71. Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 6, 1 5.16.
72. Id. 4.7.
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Certainly, this type of system is preferable where it would work.' 3 However,
it may not be practical for a country to regulate the producers of another
country. If that is the case, the Mexican dolphin-safe tuna can be seen as not
a "like product" to the U.S. dolphin-safe tuna because while one product is
regulated under a system of law that guarantees that it is dolphin-safe, the
other product is not so regulated and therefore carries no corresponding
guarantee.
B. Article XI: Quantitative Restrictions Are Prohibited, but PPM
Distinctions Should Be Permitted as Standards Necessary to Classify
Goods According to the Harm Caused During Production
GATT Article XI.1 forbids quantitative restrictions of products from
other countries, whether they are in the form of quotas, bans, or license
requirements. 74 Thus, in order to liberalize trade, Article XI prevents any
country from limiting the number and amount of products coming from
another country. The Tuna/Dolphin I panel found that the U.S. restriction on
imports from Mexico was a quantitative restriction that therefore violated
Article XI.h Unfortunately, the United States did not offer any Article XI
arguments, asserting that because its measure was a valid regulation under
Article III, there was no need to address Article XI. 76 However, the U.S. ban
on imports to Mexico should have been argued as and judged compliant
with Article XI.2(b), which provides an exception to Article XI.1. Article
XI.2(b) provides that " [tihe provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall
not extend to the following:.. .[i]mport and export prohibitions or restric-
tions necessary to the application of standards or regulations for the
classification, grading or marketing of commodities in international trade."
This exception allows a country to maintain standards for products sold
within its borders that other countries do not share. For example, under this
exception a country could keep out all toys that exceed a certain level of
lead paint.
73. See Charnovitz, supra note 3, at 67 (discussing the difference between a "how-
produced" product standard and a "government policy" product standard).
74. See GATT, supra note 5, art. XI.1 ("No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties,
taxes or other charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export licences or
other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the importation
of any product of the territory of any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for
export of any product destined for the territory of any other contracting party.").
75. Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 6, 1 5.18.
76. Id. 3.11.
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No WTO disputes have invoked Article XI.2(b), and only one GATT
dispute, the Canada-Salmon dispute, involved this measure.77 In the Canada-
Salmon dispute, Canada imposed an export ban on unprocessed herring and
salmon to the United States and claimed that its ban was justified under
Article XI.2(b) as being necessary to uphold Canadian quality standards on
unprocessed herring and salmon. 78 However, this was not a convincing
argument, and the panel rejected it because Canada also prohibited the
export of fish that met its quality standards.79
The Tuna/Dolphin I panel should have recognized the U.S.
requirement that minimal dolphins should be killed while catching tuna as
a standard relating to the classification and grading of tuna and, therefore,
a valid requirement under Article XI. 80 Measures requiring that food be
prepared in sanitary conditions relate to the process by which food is made
and are valid standards that protect health. Similarly, measures requiring
that tuna be caught in a manner that does not harm dolphins relates to the
process by which tuna is produced and should be judged as a valid
standard that protects environmental health and animal life. Just as human
health is an important concern, so too is environmental and animal health.8'
For example, just as the United States has a system of health and safety laws
to protect human health, so too does it have systems of laws to protect the
environment and animal welfare. There is no reason that these concerns
should not be relevant when it comes to international trade. In fact, human
health and environmental health are intricately entwined and human
activity harming the environment is having "profound consequences" for
human health. 2 The United States should have argued and the panel
should have found that an import prohibition from a country that has
77. Report of the Panel, Canada - Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and
Salmon, GATT BASIc LNSTRUMENS & SELECTED DocuMENTs L/6268 (Nov. 20,1987), available
at http://www.wto.org/gatt-docs/ English/SULPDF/91330016.pdf.
78. Id. 4.2.
79. Id.
80. When a country sets processing standards for products, those standards may have
to comply with certain requirements under other parts of the WTO Agreement outside of the
GATT Agreement. For example, the measure may have to comply with the Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary or Phytosanitary Measures and/or the Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade, set out in Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement. See JON R. JOHNSON, INTERNATIONAL TRADE
LAw 172, 174 (1998). However, those other agreements are outside the scope of this article,
which focuses on the GATT Agreement.
81. See generally HUNTER ET AL., supra note 14 (describing numerous serious international
environmental problems caused by degraded environmental and animal health).
82. Id. at 2.
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shown that it cannot meet dolphin-safe standards is necessary to uphold the
U.S. standards of dolphin safety for tuna sold within its borders.83
C. Article XX(a): The Public Morals Exception Should Allow PPM
Distinctions That Protect the Environment or Animal Health
GATr Article XX provides exceptions to the general trade
requirements for a variety of reasons so long as the measures are not
unjustifiable or arbitrary discrimination and are not a disguised restriction
on trade. 84 Article XX(a) provides that "nothing in this Agreement shall be
construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party
of measures.. .necessary to protect public morals." Neither the parties to the
dispute nor the panel considered whether Article XX(a) could justify an
import ban on Mexican tuna. However, Australia, a third party, expressed
the opinion that Article XX(a) could justify measures taken to prevent the
inhumane treatment of animals.8m
No GATT or WTO dispute resolution panel has analyzed, nor has
a party invoked Article XX(a).86 In its wording, it is similar to Article XX(b)
in requiring that the measure be "necessary" before it can be invoked. Thus,
it is likely that when Article XX(a) is invoked a similar analysis will be used
as that used to analyze Article XX(b). 7
83. However, the panel could reasonably have found that the differences in treatment
in setting Mexican and U.S. levels of permitted dolphin kill was an import prohibition that
was not necessary because it was discriminatory. The panel used this reasoning under XX(b)
to determine that the measure was not necessary. See infra Part I.D.3.
84. GATT Article X provides,
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restric-
tion on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to
prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures:
(a) necessary to protect public morals;
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption.
GATT, supra note 5, art. XX.
85. Tuna/Dolphin 1, supra note 6, 4.3 (argument of Australia, a third party to the
dispute).
86. See Miguel A. Gonzalez, Trade and Morality: Preserving "Public Morals" Without
Sacrificing the Global Economy, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 939, 968 n.283 (2006) ("There is no
GATT or WTO jurisprudence on the interpretation of Article XX(a)."); Alison G. Jones,
Australia's Damaging International Trade Practice: The Case Against Cruelty to Greyhounds, 14 PAc.
RIM L. & PoL'Y J. 677, 703 (2005) ("[N]o panel has yet interpreted Article XX(a).").
87. For a discussion on what "necessary" means, see infra Part I.D.2.
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Dolphins are one of the most intelligent species of mammals on
earth.' There is no doubt that they suffer when they drown in fishing nets.89
Indeed, it is likely that so many people support saving dolphinsr because
there is a sense that it is morally wrong to kill such complex and intelligent
creatures when using different fishing methods could save their lives.
Reducing demand for Mexican tuna would reduce its production, saving
dolphin life.' By banning tuna from Mexico because Mexico did not enforce
dolphin-protection standards comparable to the United States, the United
States should have argued and the panel should have found that the United
States was taking a measure "necessary" to save animal life and, thus, a
measure "necessary" to protect public morals.
D. Article XX(b): The Protection of Life and Health Exception Should
Allow PPM Distinctions That Protect the Environment or Animal Health
Under GATT Article XX(b), countries may take measures "neces-
sary to protect human, animal or plant life or health." The United States
claimed that its measures were necessary to protect dolphin life and
health.92 However, the panel found that there were three reasons why the
U.S. measure could not meet the requirements of XX(b): (1) this measure
was a measure to protect the life and health of animals located extra-
territorially from the United States, (2) the United States had not tried to
negotiate a multilateral treaty to solve the dolphin death problem, and (3)
the measures unreasonably discriminated between foreign and domestic
producers.93 Each of these reasons will be addressed in turn.
88. See Donald W. McChesney, Dolphin-Safe or Fisherman-Friendly? Abuse ofDiscretion in
Amendment of the Dolphin-Safe Tuna Labeling Standard, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1725,1727 (2005).
89. See ROD PREECE & LORNA CHAMBERLAIN, ANIMAL WELFARE AND HUMAN VALUES 269
(1995) (discussing an animal's capacity to suffer).
90. See Bower v. Evans, 257 F.3d 1058, 1060 (9th Cir. 2001) (describing public outrage
over dolphin deaths).
91. See Christopher D. Stone, Panel III: International Law, Global Environmentalism, and the
Future ofAmerican Environmental Policy, 21 EcoLOGYL.Q. 495,502 (describing how decreasing
the quantity of dolphin-unsafe tuna bought shifts the demand curve and reduces dolphin
deaths); see also Spero News, Vegetarians Adopt Turkeysfor Thanksgiving: Farm Sanctuary Lets
People Adopt Turkeys Instead of Eating Them, SPERO NEws, Nov. 8, 2004, http://speroforum.
com/site/article.asp?idarticle=1159&t=Vegetarians+adopt+turkeys+for+Thanksgiving (last
visited Apr. 10, 2008) (estimating that a vegetarian, by reducing demand for meat, saves about
93 animals per year from "the cruelty of factory farms and slaughterhouses").
92. Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 6, 3.33.
93. Id. 5.29.
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1. Extraterritorial Reach Should Not Be a Barrier
The panel noted that the text of Article XX(b) did not address
explicitly whether a country could act to protect human, animal, or plant
health or life outside its own borders.' In deciding that a country could not
act to protect life or health outside its borders, the panel reasoned that if the
interpretation of Article XX(b) suggested by the United States were
followed, each contracting party could unilaterally determine the life or
health protection regulations from which other contracting parties must not
deviate if they wished to avoid a trade sanction.95 However, because the
language of Article XX(b) requires that a measure be "necessary," as
discussed below in Part I.D.2, the number of such unilateral measures will
be limited.
The panel analyzed the history of the drafting of the GATT and
determined that the measure was intended only to protect life or health
within a country's own borders.96 However, the panel's analysis is faulty.
The plain reading of the text sets no limits and instead lets each country
decide which life or health it wishes to protect. 97 In addition, the drafting
history that the panel cites does not support its contention that the GATT
drafters only intended to allow countries to protect the life or health of
beings within their jurisdiction. An earlier draft of the provision allowed
parties to adopt measures that would otherwise be prohibited under the
GATT "[f]or the purpose of protecting human, animal or plant life or health,
if corresponding domestic safeguards under similar conditions exist in the
importing country."' 8 The panel concluded that because the drafters
dropped the second half of the clause in the final draft, they intended
countries to protect only domestic life and health.99 It is unclear how the
panel reached this conclusion. Instead, it is more likely that the additional
words were dropped because they were unnecessary. After all, the Chapeau
of Article XX prohibits "unjustifiable discrimination between countries
where the same conditions prevail." Thus, the Chapeau already requires
that so long as similar conditions prevail in the domestic country and the
foreign country, similar measures must be taken domestically as are
required of the foreign country.
In fact, long before the GATT was negotiated, countries were using
trade bans to protect the environment and health beyond their borders. For
94. Id. 5.25, 6.3.
95. Id. 5.27.
96. Id. 5.26.
97. See Charnovitz, supra note 43, at 349. For the text of Article II, see supra note 84.
98. Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 6, 5.26.
99. Id.
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example, in 1906, the United States banned the import of sponges caught in
a manner that damaged sponge beds more than was necessary." Australia,
in 1908, and the United States, in 1921, banned the importation of white
phosphorus, a product that caused a horrible occupational disease to those
making the product.1°m In 1925, the United States and Mexico agreed to
prohibit the import of fish caught in a way that harmed marine life in the
Pacific Ocean."° In 1931, Denmark and Sweden signed a treaty agreeing to
prohibit the sale of seabirds caught in a way that harmed migratory birds.'m
It is unlikely that the GATT parties, whose main goal was to lower tariffs,
would have chosen to so radically alter their rights to make the PPM
distinctions they had long been making.
Later cases have, correctly, not read into Article XX(b) a require-
ment that a measure must not affect things located extraterritorially. Indeed,
only three years later, in Tuna/Dolphin II, an extension of Tuna/Dolphin I, the
panel found that nothing in the text of the agreement supported the
contention that the animals the country sought to protect had to be within
the boundaries of the country making the regulation.1°4 The Shrimp/Furtle
dispute panels also rejected this assertion.lo
In conclusion, it is unreasonable to assert that under Article XX(b)
a country cannot seek to protect animal or human health or life beyond its
borders. Such reasoning does not comport with the plain reading of Article
XX or the long practice of countries. Additionally, not allowing PPM
distinctions could render domestic environmental or animal welfare
measures ineffective as the harmful practices forbidden at home could
simply be outsourced to other countries.
2. Multilateral Negotiation Attempts Should Be Required Concurrent with the
PPM Distinction
Mexico claimed that the United States should have promulgated an
international treaty on dolphin protection instead of taking unilateral
action."° Thailand and Venezuela agreed."° The Panel found that the
United States had not demonstrated that a trade embargo was necessary
because the United States had not tried multilateral negotiations first, and,
therefore, remedies consistent with the GATT had not been exhausted." e It
100. See Charnovitz, supra note 3, at 70.
101. See Charnovitz, supra note 43, at 340.
102. See Charnovitz, supra note 3, at 70.
103. Id.
104. Tuna/Dolphin II, supra note 20, 5.33.
105. See infra Part H.A.2.
106. Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 6, 3.34.
107. Id. 4.25, 4.27 (argument of Thailand and Venezuela, third parties).
108. Id. T 5.28.
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is reasonable that countries should try to conclude a multilateral negotiation
before, or at least concurrent with, taking unilateral action to ban a
particular trade item.
Because Article XX(b) requires measures taken to protect life or
health to be "necessary," it seems difficult for a country to justify a ban as
"necessary" if that country is not also, at the same time, trying to reach a
negotiated solution with the other side. However, the country should only
be required to make a good-faith effort to negotiate and should not be
required to water down its requirements. In fact, Mexico for years resisted
diplomatic efforts to protect dolphins.09 Countries should not have to rely
solely on international treaty making because the other country may not
respond favorably."0 Countries should be given some leeway in inter-
preting "necessary," and "necessary" should not be interpreted to be
"absolutely necessary."' It is easy to theorize other solutions that "might
work," but that does not mean that they will work or that they are
practical." 2 In fact, multilateral treaties are often extremely difficult to
make."3 In addition, sometimes it is the threat of unilateral action or a
country taking unilateral action that provides the motivation necessary to
conclude a treaty."4
3. The Unreasonable Discrimination Analysis Should Have Occurred Under the
Chapeau of Article XX Instead of Under XX(b)
The panel found that the U.S. regulations did not treat domestic
and foreign producers equally. For domestic producers, a ceiling number
was set in advance, telling them how many dolphins they could legally kill
that season. By contrast, foreign producers were given a number retro-
actively, only after the numbers of dolphin deaths from U.S. ships was
counted."' Thus, the condition was unreasonable because the Mexican
fishers could not know ahead of time what was required of them."6 While
this was unreasonable discrimination that should have rendered the U.S.
measures GAfl-inconsistent under Article XX, this analysis should have
been done under the Chapeau of Article XX, which prohibits "arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination" rather than under the main part of Article
109. Charnovitz, supra note 43, at 327.
110. Id. at 349.
111. Id. at 327.
112. Id.
113. See Charnovitz, supra note 3, at 71.
114. Id. at 72 (describing how a successful treaty to protect sea turtles did not happen until
after the United States instituted its unilateral ban, even though countries had been trying for
years to negotiate one).
115. Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 6, 5.16.
116. Id.
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XX(b)." 7 Article XX(b) simply allows measures "necessary to protect
human, animal, or plant life or health," whereas the Chapeau of Article XX
prohibits "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where
the same conditions prevail."" 8
E. Article XX(g): The Conservation of Exhaustible Natural Resources
Exception Should Allow PPM Distinctions
The United States claimed that its measures were necessary to
protect an exhaustible resource - dolphins - and that without these
embargo provisions, its actions regulating domestic producers' take would
have minimal effect." 9
The panel found similar problems with the U.S. measures as it had
found under Article XX(b). The panel did not approve of the extraterritorial
nature of the U.S. measures, which "unilaterally determine[d] the conserva-
tion policies from which [Mexico] could not deviate without jeopardizing
fits] rights under the General Agreement." 2 ° Similar to the criticism above
in Part I.D.1, since the text of Article XX(g) does not limit a country to
protecting resources solely within its own jurisdiction, Article XX(g) should
not be so limited.
The panel found that even if a state could make laws that have
extraterritorial influence, the measures fail XX(g) because they do not treat
Mexican and U.S. producers equally. Similar to the reasons stated above,'2'
this analysis and finding should have occurred under the Chapeau of
Article XX instead of under the body of XX(g).
Interestingly, the panel did not mention that the United States
should have attempted multilateral negotiations before imposing the import
restrictions under Article XX(g), whereas the panel did find that negotia-
tions should have taken place before the ban under Article XX(b). This
difference in requirements under Article XX(b) and Article XX(g) is reason-
able because while measures under Article XX(b) must be "necessary" to
protect life or health, measures under Article XX(g) need only be "relating
to" the conservation of natural resources.Y
117. See discussion supra Part I.D.3. Although the result of a finding of "arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination" is the same whether found under the Chapeau of Article XX or
under Article XX(b)-the measure is GATT-inconsistent-it makes more sense to do the
analysis under the Chapeau of Article XX because it is there that such discrimination is
explicitly forbidden.
118. GATT, supra note 5, art. XX.
119. Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 6, 3.40-3.41.
120. Id. 1 5.32.
121. See supra Part I.D.3.
122. GATT, supra note 5, art. XX.
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F. The Chapeau of Article XX Prohibits Arbitrary or Unjustifiable
Discrimination and Thus Can Prevent PPM Distinctions from Being
Applied Unfairly
To accommodate concerns such as national security, health, morals,
and the environment, Article XX lays out a number of exceptions to the
trade constraints contained within the rest of the GATT provisions.123 The
Chapeau of Article XX forbids measures taken pursuant to Article XX(a)
through 0) from being "applied in a manner which would constitute a
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where
the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international
trade." This is to ensure that countries do not use the exceptions in Article
XX to advance the protectionist goals that the rest of the treaty is meant to
dispel. The Tuna/Dolphin panel did not address the Chapeau, or introduc-
tory phrases, of Article XX. Subsequent WTO panels have ruled that the
Chapeau analysis should come after the analysis of whether the challenged
measure fits into the lettered exceptions of Article XX(a) through (j).24
The U.S. law required that the average dolphin death rate for
Mexico's tuna fleet must not exceed 1.25 times the average dolphin death
rate of U.S. vessels in the same period.1" While at first it may seem that such
a law was favorable to Mexican producers, in practice it meant that the
Mexican producers could not know at any point in time how many dolphins
they were allowed to kill, whereas the U.S. producers did. Thus, the panel
should have found, under the Chapeau of Article XX, that the law
unjustifiably discriminated against Mexican producers as compared to U.S.
producers, even though the same conditions applied (fishing for tuna while
trying to reduce incidental dolphin deaths).126
Additionally, the U.S. law automatically shut down exports from
Mexico if its producers did not meet the requirements but did not shut
down U.S. sales to U.S. consumers if U.S. producers did not meet the
requirements."2 Thus, while Mexican producers lost the U.S. market for at
least an entire season if they failed to comply with the U.S. standards, no
123. Id.; see JACKSON, supra note 4, at 22-23.
124. See Shrimp/Turtle I, supra note 10, 118-20; Appellate Body Report, United
States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29,1996)
pt. IV, 1, at 22, http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispue/cases-e/ds2_e.htm (follow
"Appellate Body Report" hyperlink; then follow "preview (HTML)" hyperlink) (last visited
July 30, 2008).
125. Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 6, 2.6.
126. Instead it found it unjustifiable under Article XX(b) and Article XX(g). See supra text
accompanying notes 113 and 120.
127. Tuna/Dolphin 1, supra note 6, 4.7 (argument of Canada, a third party).
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such drastic economic penalty was imposed upon U.S. producers who
failed to comply with the U.S. standards." s Although the panel did not
address this issue, the panel should have found this measure to be unjustifi-
able discrimination under the Chapeau of Article XX.
Finally, the U.S. law required that before a foreign country's tuna
fishing regulations could be considered comparable to U.S. regulations, the
share of Eastern spinner dolphin and coastal spotted dolphin killed relative
to total incidental killing of dolphin during each one-year fishing season
must not exceed 15 percent and two percent respectively, although no such
percentages applied to the U.S. fleet. 9 Instead, the U.S. fleet had absolute
numbers of Eastern spinner dolphin and coastal spotted dolphin that it
could kill, which corresponded to 15 percent and two percent of the total
absolute number of dolphin it was permitted to kill." This difference
should have been found to be arbitrary discrimination by the panel because,
while the U.S. fleet could kill 100 percent Eastern spinner dolphin (so long
as that 100 percent was below the numerical limit for Eastern spinner
dolphin-for example, by killing only 20 dolphins all year and all those
dolphins being Eastern spinner dolphin), the Mexican fleet could not. In
that way, Mexico's fleet was more constrained than the U.S. fleet. This
should have been judged arbitrary discrimination because it unnecessarily
disadvantaged the Mexican fleet as compared to the U.S. fleet.
G. The Effect of the Panel's Ruling Could Have Been to Prohibit a PPM
Distinction
Mexico decided not to press the GATT members to adopt the panel
decision because at that time Mexico was trying to negotiate NAFTA and
it was widely thought that pressing the tuna/ dolphin issue would harm the
public opinion of NAFTA and make its passage less likely.' The panel's
ruling was unpopular with environmental groups and contributed toward
anti-globalization and anti-trade sentiment in portions of the population,
adding fuel to the fire that exploded in the anti-globalization protests in
Seattle in 1999.132
However, if the panel decision had been adopted, Mexico could
have obtained one of two remedies against the United States: (1) Mexico
could have retaliated with trade barriers that would have harmed the
United States to the equal extent that Mexico was harmed or (2) the United
128. Id.
129. Id. 2.6.
130. Id. 2.4, 2.6.
131. Charnovitz, supra note 43, at 302.
132. See JACKSON, supra note 7, at 238.
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States would have had to conform to the panel's decision by amending its
law."n Had the United States amended its laws to conform with the panel's
decision, it would have had to end the embargo against Mexican tuna and
treat tuna from Mexico's producers exactly the same as tuna from U.S.
producers, even though doing so would mean a higher rate of dolphin
death.
If instead the panel had decided the case using the reasoning
outlined above, the United States would simply have had to make minor
changes to its law so that Mexican and U.S. producers were treated equally
and fairly. This would have involved giving both Mexico and the United
States numerical maximums of permissible dolphin death before the fishing
year began. It would also have included the possibility of a sale ban against
U.S. producers, on the same footing as the embargo possibility against
Mexican producers, or otherwise equalizing the consequences for U.S. and
Mexican producers if they did not conform to the dolphin death standards.
II. SHRIMP/rURTLE 1 (1998)
By the time the next PPM dispute came around, the WTO had been
created. "M Within just a few short years after the Tuna/Dolphin dispute, the
United States was back before an international trade panel over a very
similar measure. In this case, endangered sea turtles were being killed when
they were trapped in fishing nets used to capture shrimp. In response, U.S.
law required the use of "turtle excluder devices" (TEDs) by domestic
industry when catching shrimp. 3 The law also prohibited the importation
of shrimp from vessels under the jurisdiction of countries not certified as
having comparable methods for protecting sea turtles.136 India, Pakistan,
Thailand, and Malaysia challenged the law at the WTO.
137
The United States argued that its measure was allowable under
GATT Article XX(g) and, in the alternative, under Article XX(b)." The
opposing parties asserted that a party must seek multilateral negotiations
to an environmental problem and should never unilaterally prohibit trade
of a certain product simply because of the process used to make the
product. 39 Third-party participants Australia, Ecuador, and the European
Community agreed that the United States should have engaged in
133. See, e.g., id. at 116 (discussing the case of The Netherlands against the United States).
134. See JACKSON, supra note 7, at 124-27 (explaining the WTO dispute resolution process).
135. Conservation of Sea Turtles, Importation of Shrimp Act, Pub. L. No. 101-162,103 Stat.
1037 (Nov. 21, 1989).
136. Id.
137. Shrimp/Turtle 1, supra note 10, 8.
138. Id. 10. For the text of these provisions, see supra note 84.
139. Id. 35.
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multilateral negotiations before passing this law.'" A WTO panel report
found that the measure violated GATT Article XI and was not saved by
Article XX.' 4 The United States appealed to the Appellate Body of the
WTO, which reversed the panel's findings but nevertheless found that the
U.S. measures, while provisionally justified under Article XX(g), violated
the Chapeau of Article XX.' 4
A. Article XX(g) Allows PPM Distinctions That Protect Endangered
Species
The Appellate Body found that the U.S. measures met the
requirements of Article XX(g). "
1. The WTO Agreement Was Interpreted in Light of Its Goals of Sustainable
Development and Environmental Protection
The Appellate Body, in determining whether sea turtles could be
considered an exhaustible resource, looked to the Preamble of the WTO
Agreement and noted that it explicitly listed the goals of sustainable
development and preserving the environment.'" Citing an International
Court of Justice decision that discussed treaty interpretation,'" the
Appellate Body stated that those words of XX(g) "must be read.. .in light of
contemporary concerns." In the face of Malaysia's argument that when
the GATT Agreement was originally signed the word "resource" only
applied to non-living things, the Appellate Body found that in light of more
modern treaties, the word also applies to living things.47 The Appellate
Body concluded that sea turtles are an exhaustible resource because they
are listed as an endangered species in the Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species (CITES).'"
Thus, the Appellate Body reasoned that the WTO Agreement
should be interpreted in light of its plain meaning, its preamble, the context
of current concerns, and other international treaties. Under this reasoning,
PPM distinctions made by individual countries to improve the environment
140. Id. 54,64,68.
141. Id. 7.
142. Shrimp/Turtle 1, supra note 10, 187(c).
143. See supra note 33 for the text of Article XX(g).
144. Shrimp/Turtle I, supra note 10, 129.
145. Id. 130 & n.109 (citing Namibia (Legal Consequences) Advisory Opinion (1971)
I.C.J. Rep. at 31 and Aegean Continental Shelf Case (1978) I.C.J. Rep. at 3).
146. Id. 129.
147. Id. T 130.
148. Id. 132. CITES acts to protect endangered and threatened species worldwide. See
HUNTER ET AL., supra note 14, at 1096.
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and/or animal welfare outside their territories should not be judged as
violating the WTO Agreement. Indeed, these PPM distinctions can often
work to radically improve conditions important to current concerns.149
2. Extraterritoriality Was Not a Barrier
As discussed earlier, the panel decision below found the U.S.
measure unjustifiable under Article XX, reasoning that the measure
required other countries to adopt standards comparable to standards within
the United States.'50 The panel then used a slippery slope argument to
conclude that this could lead to every country taking such measures,
resulting in a complete blockage of trade."5 The Appellate Body reversed
this interpretation, saying that the panel had failed to abide by the plain
meaning of Article XX(g) and that the WTO treaty should be interpreted
according to its plain meaning.
5 2
At the same time that the Appellate Body reversed the reasoning
of the panel, it also contradicted the reasoning of the Tuna/Dolphin I GATT
panel.'5 3 The Appellate Body found that for the Article XX exceptions to
have meaning within the treaty, Article XX must allow some government
measures that restrict imports based upon the policy decisions of the
exporting country.' 4 Indeed, in a later decision, Shrimp/Turtle II, the
Appellate Body upheld such measures taken to protect the environment
and animal welfare beyond the country's own borders.5 5
The Appellate Body did not decide whether there was an implied
jurisdictional limit to Article XX(g) but found that, because the sea turtle
species at issue migrate into U.S. waters, there was a "sufficient nexus"
between the United States and the turtles for the purposes of Article
XX(g).' s In future disputes, the Appellate Body should definitively hold
that there is no jurisdictional limit to Article XX(g), especially so far as it
applies to environmental concerns. This is because, as the international
community has recognized by treaty, the environment everywhere is a
"common concern of humankind."5 7
149. See Charnovitz, supra note 3, at 70, 340 (giving examples of environmental PPMs
throughout history that have acted to help the environment).
150. See Shrimp/Turtle I, supra note 10, 112.
151. See id.
152. Id. 114.
153. See supra Part I.D.1.
154. Shrimp/Turtle I, supra note 10, 121.
155. See infra Part III.A.
156. Shrimp/Turtle I, supra note 10, 133.
157. Secretariat on the Convention on Biological Diversity, Convention on Biological
Diversity Preamble, http://www.biodiv.org/convention/ articles.shtml?a=cbd-00 (last visited
Apr. 7, 2008).
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B. The Chapeau of Article XX Was Used to Prohibit Arbitrary and
Unjustifiable Discrimination
The Appellate Body pointed out that the preamble to the WTO
Agreement was different from the preamble of the GATT Agreement.158
Whereas the preamble of the GATT Agreement had stated that its goal was
"the full use of the world's resources," the preamble of the WTO Agreement
states that its goal is "the optimal use of the world's resources in accordance
with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and
preserve the environment."159 The Appellate Body used the language of the
WTP Agreement preamble to interpret the Chapeau of Article XX.'o
1. The U.S. Measures Were Unfairly Inflexible
The Appellate Body found that the measure failed the Chapeau of
Article XX because, in practice, only countries that adopted substantially the
same measures that the United States had adopted were approved for
certification.161 This was unlike the measures at issue in Tuna/Dolphin I,
where foreign countries simply had to show that their fishing methods
killed a low number of dolphins. There it did not matter what methods the
foreign countries used to obtain the desired result. However, in this case, as
the Appellate Body noted, the U.S. measure required countries to impose
almost exactly the same measures as the U.S. measures. Thus, the Appellate
Body found that the discrimination was unjustifiable and arbitrary because
the United States did not take into account the different conditions that may
be present in different countries. 62
Thus, in this case, coercion or pressure on a country to change its
production methods for a particular product was not found to be a problem
by the Appellate Body. Instead, the problem was the lack of flexibility in the
requirements for change. To the Appellate Body, performance standards -
those standards that require a certain performance, such as a certain
number of turtle killed per shrimp caught -are acceptable. By contrast,
design standards - those standards that require that a certain technology be
used in the production of a product, such as the use of a certain kind of
fishing net-are unacceptable. This distinction by the Appellate Body is
reasonable for two reasons: (1) performance standards, because they
encourage ingenuity and invention, are inherently more economically
158. Shrimp/Turtle I, supra note 10, 7 152.
159. Id.; see also WTO Agreement, supra note 15.
160. ShrimpTurtle I, supra note 10, 155.
161. Id. 7 161.
162. Id. 77 164, 177.
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efficient than design standards1" and (2) performance standards, because
they allow a country to come up with its own methods of accomplishing a
goal, are more respectful of the sovereign decision-making authority of each
country.
2. The United States Instituted Other, Unjustifiable Trade Sanctions
The Appellate Body noted that the United States did not allow the
import of shrimp that were caught by TED-using boats that were fishing in
waters of non-certified countries."M Thus, the United States was boycotting
shrimp caught using methods that it knew were turtle-safe. The Appellate
Body found that this was a direct measure to influence another country's
laws, which was unacceptable.16 ' The Appellate Body also found that the
action taken by the United States was difficult to reconcile with the stated
purpose of conserving sea turtles."6 However, the U.S. action, by trying to
change the laws of another country, could be seen as attempting to further
a conservation goal. This type of measure can be seen as analogous to an
individual boycotting all products of a company, whether or not they are
tested on animals, in an effort to pressure the company to stop testing on
animals. It is unclear whether the Appellate Body was right in finding that
this type of action by the United States was in violation of Article XX. After
all, the United States issued its trade sanction in the same area as the policy
it was trying to influence. However, if countries were allowed to use trade
sanctions in this way, it may be difficult to draw the line between acceptable
and unacceptable trade measures. For example, taken to its limit, this kind
of trade measure could justify the United States in banning imports of toys
from Thailand until Thailand started fishing with turtle-safe nets.
One thing worth noting is that several international environmental
treaty regimes use trade sanctions in order to influence the policy choices
of other countries, even countries that are not parties to the treaties.16 7 It is
unclear whether such treaties would or should be found to violate the WTO
Agreement.16
163. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, Goals, Instruments, and Environmental
Policy Choice, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 297, 307 (2000) (describing the advantages that
performance standards have over design standards).
164. Shrimp/Turtle I, supra note 10, 165.
165. See id.
166. Id.
167. See Charnovitz, supra note 43, at 334-35 (citing the Montreal Protocol on Substances
that Deplete the Ozone Layer and the Basel Convention on Hazardous Waste).
168. A discussion on this topic is outside the scope of this article.
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3. Attempts at Multilateral Treaty Making Were Required Concurrent to a PPM
Distinction
The Appellate Body found that because the United States had not
attempted to make multilateral agreements to conserve sea turtles, the
United States had unjustifiably discriminated against the countries against
whom it had instituted a shrimp import ban.169 The Appellate Body cited
many multilateral treaties that call for the use of multilateral negotiations
to solve the world's environmental problems." The Appellate Body noted
that the United States did negotiate and conclude one treaty for the
protection of sea turtles: The Inter-American Convention." This agreement
indicates that the parties thought that multilateral negotiations were the
solution to conserving turtles.1' The Appellate Body found that the
existence of this treaty between the United States and some WTO members
showed that an alternative course of action was open to the United States
with respect to other WTO members." 3 However, the Appellate Body did
note that import prohibitions are the heaviest weapons a country has.174
On the one hand, this analysis by the Appellate Body is troubling.
First, the Appellate Body was analyzing the U.S. measure under Article
XX(g), which requires only that the measure "relat[e] to the conservation of
natural resources," not that the measure be "necessary" to the conservation
of natural resources. In Tuna/Dolphin I it seems that the panel took note of
this difference in terminology by requiring that the United States first try
multilateral negotiations before instituting a measure under Article XX(b),
which uses the "necessary" language, but not under Article XX(g), which
does not."
On the other hand, in practicality, it is probably better if nations try
to come to some sort of negotiated agreement before or concurrent with
instituting a unilateral trade ban upon the products of one country.
Additionally, it can be interpreted under the Chapeau of Article XX that, if
a country is not given warning that there is a problem and not consulted for
possible negotiations before a trade ban is instituted against it, that country
has been unjustifiably discriminated against as compared to the home
country. Arguably, the same conditions prevail because both countries are
producing a product for sale, but one is consulted in the decision-making
process (because it is the home country, it is naturally consulted in domestic
169. Shrimp/Furtle 1, supra note 10, 166.
170. Id. 168.
171. Id. 169.
172. Id. 170.
173. Id. 171.
174. Id.
175. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
legislative and regulatory decision making), whereas the other is not. This
can be seen as analogous to a due process argument that before a person's
statutory entitlements are taken away, that person is entitled to notice and
a chance to be heard.176 Here, before a country's treaty entitlements (to
export its products) are taken away, perhaps it is reasonable that it too
should be entitled to notice and a chance to be heard, in the form of being
consulted for negotiations.
While it may be reasonable to require that a country attempt to
negotiate a multilateral agreement before or concurrent with instituting a
unilateral trade ban, conclusion of a multilateral treaty should not be a
prerequisite for a country taking an environmental or animal welfare trade
measure. 177 Otherwise, a country wishing to avoid changing its policy while
at the same time wishing to avoid a trade ban could simply block negotia-
tions with no consequence. Further, if a country becomes aware of an
environmental issue, it should not have to wait the years that it sometimes
takes to negotiate a treaty before taking action. Instead, an interim trade
measure or a trade measure concurrent with negotiations should be
permitted.
4. The U.S. Measures Unfairly Discriminated Between Different Countries
The Appellate Body in Shrimp/Turtle I found that the United States
discriminated among WTO members because it provided financial
assistance and longer timelines for compliance for Caribbean and Western
Hemisphere countries than for the four Asian countries that brought the
case."7h Additionally, the Body found that the United States made greater
efforts to transfer technology to some countries than to others.179 The
Appellate Body was correct to reason that these measures were unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, in
violation of the Chapeau of Article XX.
5. The U.S. Process Violated Due Process of Law
In the U.S. certification process, there was no way for a country to
be heard, to appeal the administrative decision not to certify its producers
176. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,267-68 (1970) (holding that before a statutory
entitlement is taken away, a person is entitled to due process, which includes notice and a
right to be heard).
177. Cf. Dailey, supra note 18, at 377 (arguing that governments should not have to
negotiate and attempt to make a treaty with other nations before using Article XX); see also
decision of Shrimp/Turtle II discussed infra Part IlI.A.1.
178. Shrimp/Turtle I, supra note 10, 173 (some countries had three years to implement the
changes, whereas others had four months).
179. Id. 175.
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as importers, or even to get a reason why it was rejected for certification."W
Therefore, the Body found that there was no due process for countries
whose certification was denied, in violation of GATT Article X, which
requires transparency in matters that affect trade." This added to the
Body's conclusion that the discrimination was arbitrary under the Chapeau
of Article XX'
82
C. Article III and Article XI: National Treatment and Quantitative
Restrictions Were Not Argued
Because it did not put forth any arguments to say otherwise, the
United States apparently conceded that its measures violated Article III, the
article requiring like treatment for like products, and Article XI, the article
forbidding quantitative restrictions on foreign products."0 The Shrimp/Turtle
I Appellate Body apparently adopted the report of the panel and the finding
that the U.S. measures violated Article XI because it found that the United
States should amend its laws to conform with the panel's finding on Article
XI insofar as the Appellate Body found the U.S. law inconsistent with
Article XX.'8
This failure to put forth arguments and address Article III and
Article XI by the United States was perhaps due to the experience at the
Tuna/Dolphin GATT panels.1" However, these arguments should have been
raised in light of the faulty reasoning of the Tuna/Dolphin panel report as
discussed above.1
Additionally, the Shrimp/Turtle I Body may have looked favorably
on these kinds of arguments, because in interpreting Article XX(g) it
explained that if a piece of a treaty is not clear, that section should be inter-
preted in light of the treaty's purpose and objective. 87 Here, sustainable
development and environmental protection are part of the object and
purpose of the WTO Agreement, whereas they were not in the GATT
Agreement.'" Therefore, any future WTO panel confronted with the issue
should include "environmental impact" in its assessment of whether two
products are "like products." In addition, in light of more modem treaties,
the words "like products" should not refer to two products whose produc-
180. Id. 180.
181. Id. 181.
182. Id. 184.
183. See supra Part L.A-B.
184. Shrimp/Turtle I, supra note 10, 188.
185. See supra Part L.A-B.
186. See supra Part L.A-B.
187. See supra Part II.A.1.
188. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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tion methods result in vastly different "'ecological footprints"' (environ-
mental cost of production).189 This is especially true when consumers and
citizens are increasingly concerned about the ecological impact of the
products they buy.19
III. SHRIMP/TURTLE 11 (2001)
In order to comply with the findings in Shrimp/Turtle I, the United
States made changes to its regulations so that they would no longer
constitute unjustified and arbitrary discrimination in violation of the
Chapeau of Article XX. Among other things, the United States amended its
laws so that countries denied certification to sell their shrimp in the United
States now have an appeal process and are provided reasons for the
denial. 191 Additionally, U.S. law now requires importing countries to fish for
shrimp in a manner that is only "'comparable in effectiveness, '" 192 not
"'essentially the same" to the U.S. methods.1 93 In addition, the United States
began serious efforts at concluding a multilateral treaty. Nonetheless,
Malaysia appealed to the WTO under Article 21.5 of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU), challenging the U.S. changes as insufficient. A WTO
panel found that the United States had made sufficient changes so that its
law was no longer discriminatory. Thus, the law was justified under GATT
Article XX. Malaysia appealed, and in Shrimp/Turtle II the Appellate Body
upheld the panel's finding.194 However, the Body did require the United
States to continue "ongoing serious good faith efforts to reach a multilateral
agreement."'9
A. The Appellate Body Found That the U.S. Measures No Longer
Constituted Unjustified Discrimination Under the Chapeau of Article XX
1. The United States Was Conducting Adequate Multilateral Negotiations
The Appellate Body elaborated on the duty to negotiate a multi-
lateral agreement, and concluded that it was not a duty to conclude a treaty,
as Malaysia argued, but rather simply a duty to negotiate.'" The Appellate
Body reiterated and agreed with the finding in Shrimp/Turtle I that the fact
that the United States had negotiated with some WTO members but not all
189. Charnovitz, supra note 3, at 70.
190. Id.
191. Shrimp/Turtle II, supra note 13, 147.
192. Id. 141.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. 152.
196. Id. 1 115.
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was unjustifiable discrimination."9 It concluded that if comparable efforts
are made at negotiating with different WTO members, then it is unlikely
that unjustifiable discrimination will be found because of differences in
negotiation efforts."' The Appellate Body found that because the United
States was now conducting good faith negotiations with all relevant parties,
it was not acting in a manner constituting arbitrary or unjustified dis-
crimination.199
2. Performance Standards Are Acceptable Whereas Design Standards Are Not
The Appellate Body agreed with finding of the panel below that a
measure by one WTO country conditioning access to that country's markets
on the adoption of policies "essentially the same" as that country's policies
would be unjustifiable discrimination, whereas requiring the policies to be
"comparable in effectiveness" would not be arbitrary discrimination.2 ° The
Appellate Body noted that the "comparable in effectiveness" standard
automatically takes into account the different conditions that exist between
countries.2m
3. The New Measures Provided Adequate Due Process of Law
The United States' revised guidelines provided for detailed
reasoning to be supplied to any country that did not meet the certification
requirements. Additionally, the new guidelines provided an opportunity
for such a non-certifed country to reply and have additional information
considered.2'
B. The Effect of the Appellate Body's Ruling: Positive Implications for
Future Cases
This is the first example in the history of GATT and the WTO that
a unilateral extraterritorial national measure was upheld on environmental
grounds. This ruling should make countries more secure in knowing that
they can implement measures to protect the environment or animal life that
exist beyond their borders.2m The ruling should also assist nations in
knowing whether they are in compliance with or in breach of international
law. This decision shows that countries may place restrictive measures or
197. Id. 9 121.
198. Id. 122.
199. Id. 9 134.
200. Id. 9 141.
201. Id. 9 142,144.
202. Id. 147.
203. This reasoning would probably also apply to PPM distinctions made to affect human
rights abroad, but that topic is beyond the scope of this article.
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bans on products from other countries if those measures "relat[e] to the
conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made
effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or
consumption."' Examples of exhaustible natural resources that may be
protected are endangered or threatened animal or plant life, forests, clean
air, the ozone layer, and clean water.2 °' Some restrictive trade measures that
would now seem possible for a country to take would be such things as
restricting imports of electricity, oil, or other products from a country that
does not regulate and limit the greenhouse gas emissions released in the
production of such materials;2°6 prohibiting the importation of wood
products grown in an unsustainable manner; and prohibiting the importa-
tion of materials that release ozone-depleting substances into the
atmosphere.
However, the Shrimp/Turtle decisions also show that countries wish-
ing to take such measures must do so carefully: they must not unjustifiably
or arbitrarily discriminate against the products from the other country as
this would violate the Chapeau of Article XX.207 Thus, any country wishing
to take a trade restrictive measure in order to conserve a natural resource
should do such things as make sure that the standards imposed on the other
country are no harsher than the standards imposed domestically, attempt
to start bilateral or multilateral negotiations before or concurrently with the
trade measure, have full transparency of the decision-making process and
appeal rights for the country judged not to comply with the standards, and
allow "sufficient flexibility" in the standard so that a country has the option
to meet the environmental or animal welfare goal through different
methods than those used by the importing and restricting country.2m
C. Questions Left Unanswered
The Shrimp/Turtle dispute panels addressed GATT Article XI and
Article XX(g) and the Chapeau of Article XX in the context of protecting
endangered sea turtles that were argued by the United States to be "an
204. GATr, supra note 5, art. XX(g).
205. See HuNTER Er AL., supra note 14, at 1-17.
206. Among other things, this type of trade restriction would help reduce climate change
and thus help protect endangered arctic species such as the polar bear. See Sarah Rachel
Morgan, Polar Bears and the Laws Governing Them in the Five Artic States (Michigan State
University College of Law Animal Legal and Historical Center, 2007),
http://www.animallaw.info/articles/dduspolarbears.htm (describing how polar bears are
threatened with extinction by climate change).
207. See supra Parts U.B, II.A.
208. See supra Parts II.B, IMl.A.
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exhaustible natural resource." 209 Thus, there are some questions left
unanswered by the decision.
1. Can Article III Be Interpreted So That PPM Distinctions Are Upheld?
Article III was not addressed in the Shrimp/Turtle dispute. Article
III requires that "like products" from different countries be treated alike."0
Because the United States had placed a complete trade ban on shrimp from
certain countries, the parties and the panels reviewed the U.S. measure
under Article XI, which forbids quantitative restrictions on goods from a
country. However, in future disputes, a similar measure could be
challenged under Article III, as it was in the Tuna/Dolphin dispute.2 "
Additionally, it is conceivable that some trade measures would not put a
complete ban on all products from a certain country, but rather put a de
facto ban or a partial ban on goods from a specific country. For example, a
country may ban packaging. Furthermore, it may be infeasible for pro-
ducers in the neighboring country to change their factories and equipment
to produce biodegradable packaging.2 In such a case, an argument could
be made under Article III that such a ban is not on a "like product" because
of the differences in environmental impacts of the two products. While this
article has argued that such an argument should be successful,213 whether
this type of argument would in fact succeed is a question that has been left
for another day.
2. Can Article XI.2 Be Interpreted to Permit PPM Distinctions Necessary to Meet
Environmental or Animal Welfare Goals?
GATJ' Article XI prohibits quantitative restrictions on products
from abroad. However, in Article XI(2)(b) there is an exception made for
"[ilmport and export prohibitions or restrictions necessary to the applica-
tion of standards or regulations for the classification, grading or marketing
of commodities in international trade." 4 In the Shrimp/Turtle disputes, the
United States did not make the argument that its ban on shrimp from
countries that did not meet its turtle-protection standards was necessary to
meet a "standard.. .for the classification" of a commodity in international
trade. Instead, the United States chose to rely on the Article XX(g) exception
to justify its import restriction measure. However, in the future it could be
argued by a country with a similar restriction that the restriction does not
209. Shrimp/Turtle II, supra note 13, 1 3.38.
210. See supra Part I.A.
211. See supra Part I.A.
212. Example taken from JOHN H. JACKSON, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF GATT AND THE WTO:
INSIGHTS ON TREATY LAW AND EcoNoMIc RELATIONS 420 (2000).
213. See supra Part I.A.1.
214. See supra Part I.B.
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violate Article XI at all because it falls within the exception of Article
XI(2)(b).21 Thus, there would be no need to argue that the measure is saved
by Article XX(g).
3. Can Article XX(a) or Article XX(b) Be Used to Protect Animal or Plant Life?
In the Shrimp/Furtle dispute, the Appellate Body did not decide
whether the trade measure was valid under Article XX(a) or Article XX(b).
Article XX(a) provides protection for trade measures "necessary to protect
public morals," whereas Article XX(b) provides protection for trade
measures "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health."216
The United States could have, but did not argue that it goes against public
morals to allow sea turtles to be killed unnecessarily. 217 By contrast, under
Article XX(b), the United States did argue that its measure was necessary
to protect animal life and health; however, this was only an alternative
argument, which the Body did not reach.' 8 Perhaps these arguments were
not made, or made only in the alternative, because of the higher burden
under Article XX(a) and Article XX(b) as opposed to Article XX(g). Under
Article XX(a) and Article XX(b), the challenged measure must be
"necessary" to accomplish the goal; whereas, under Article XX(g), the
challenged measure need only be "relating to" the conservation of a natural
resource.219 In the Shrimp/Turtle disputes, endangered sea turtles were
deemed an exhaustible natural resource. Thus, the decisions leave open the
question as to whether a measure that protects the welfare of a non-
endangered species would receive as much protection as a measure that
protects an endangered species.
CONCLUSION
Process and production method distinctions made by countries can
be powerful forces toward positive environmental and/or animal welfare
change. This article has demonstrated how environmental and animal
welfare PPM distinctions can coexist with the framework of the inter-
national trade regime. Recent interpretations by the WTO Appellate Body
have shown that environmental and animal welfare goals, at least in the
context of conserving natural resources, need not be thwarted by the WTO/
GATT trade regime. Hopefully, future WTO panels will follow these
positive first steps to continue to allow appropriately crafted PPM distinc-
215. See supra Part I.B.
216. See supra Part I.C-D.
217. See Shrimp/Turtle I, supra note 10, T 125; see also supra Part I.C.
218. See Shrimp/Turtle I, supra note 10, 28, 125, 146; see also supra Part I.D.
219. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 48
Winter 2008] WHEN THE CREATION OF A PRODUCT CAUSES HARM 51
tions that protect environmental and animal welfare goals. Hopefully,
future WTO panels will follow these positive first steps to continue to allow
appropriately crafted PPM distinctions that further environmental and
animal welfare goals.
